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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, MORG, NATO, GW

SUBJECT: CSCE/CBM'S: EMBASSY OBSERVER REPORT

BEGIN SUMMARY: AN EMBASSY OFFICER VISITED BOTH THE GROSSER BAER (SEPTEMBER 6-9) AND LARES TEAM (SEPTEMBER 13-17) MANEUVERS AS A CSCE OBSERVER. THE PURPOSE OF ATTENDING BOTH SETS OF MANEUVERS WAS TO DETERMINE HOW OBSERVERS WERE TREATED AND WHAT THEY WERE SHOWN IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE BY WARSAW PACT OBSERVERS AT NEXT YEAR'S NATO EXERCISES. WE ALSO INCLUDE SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY U.S. AUTHORITIES IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT CSCE OBSERVER GROUP. END SUMMARY.

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS DESIGNED FOR NATO AND WASHINGTON AGENCY REVIEW IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE
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ALLIED MANEUVERS TO WHICH CSCE OBSERVERS MAY BE INVITED.

CBM'S ARE STILL AT A RELATIVELY EARLY STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND THE KEY QUESTION REGARDING HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE IS ACTUALLY BUILT THROUGH INVITATIONS TO MANEUVERS REMAINS OPEN. IT WILL PROBABLY REMAIN OPEN UNTIL WARSAW PACT OBSERVERS FINALLY ACCEPT OUR INVITATION AND WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAUGE THEIR REACTION TO WHAT THEY ARE SHOWN.

2. IN SEEKING TO DEVELOP A MEANINGFUL CSCE OBSERVER PROGRAM, THE EMBASSY RECOGNIZES THAT WE ALL MAY HAVE TO SORT OUT CONFLICTING PRIORITIES ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE SHOWN. WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE THUS FAR INVITED ONLY NATO FLANK COUNTRIES TO OBSERVE MANEUVERS, ALTHOUGH WE ANTICIPATE THEIR INVITATIONS WILL SOME DAY INCLUDE THE U.S. AS WELL. THE PACT IS STILL OBVIOUSLY FEELING ITS WAY ABOUT HOW TO TREAT OBSERVERS AND WHAT TO SHOW THEM. WE BELIEVE THAT OBSERVER EXCHANGES SUCH AS THESE WILL BE OF INCREASING VALUE FOR THE WEST AND THAT IT IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE THEIR EXPANSION. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT DEVELOPMENT OF OPEN AND COMPREHENSIVE OBSERVER PROGRAMS BY THE ALLIES WILL TEND TO MOVE THE PACT IN A SIMILAR DIRECTION.

3. OUR PROBLEM IS TO HANDLE WARSAW PACT (AND OTHER) OBSERVERS IN A MANNER THAT WILL ENHANCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT MUTUAL OBSERVERS WILL BE ROUTINELY EXCHANGED. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE SET FORTH BELOW SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A REVIEW OF ALLIED CBM PROCEDURES AS OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE DIALOGUE ON THE SUBJECT.

4. ATTENDEES: A TOTAL OF 22 AND 21 OBSERVERS RESPECTIVELY ATTENDED THE GROSSER BAER AND LARES TEAM MANEUVERS, WITH CYPRIOU AMBASSADOR PANAYIDES THE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE AT GROSSER BAER AND PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR RODRUES THE SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE AT LARES TEAM. NEUTRAL OR NON-ALIGNED STATES REPRESENTED INCLUDED AUSTRIA, IRELAND, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA. ALL OTHER OBSERVERS REPRESENTED NATO STATES.

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5. WHAT THE OBSERVERS SAW. BOTH GERMAN AND U.S. AUTHORITIES PLACED HELICOPTERS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE CSCE OBSERVERS TO FACILITATE TRAVEL FROM POINT TO POINT. THE HELICOPTERS WERE USED WHENEVER WEATHER CONDITIONS PERMITTED. WHEN WEATHER WAS BAD, BUSES WERE USED.

LARES TEAM OBSERVERS SAW A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF GROUND FORCES AND MILITARY HARDWARE IN ACTION. FOR

EXAMPLE, THE VISITORS SAW A HAWK BATTERY THE FIRST AFTERNOON AND WERE PERMITTED TO INSPECT ALL PIECES OF EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE SYSTEM. THE OBSERVERS ALSO HAD A CLOSEUP LOOK AT A U.S. TANK COMPANY AND CANADIAN AND U.S. ARTILLERY BATTERIES. HELICOPTERS ABOUNDED.

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THE GROSSER BAER FIELD VISITS WERE FRANKLY A DIS-APPOINTMENT. FROM WHAT THE OBSERVERS SAW, IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT SOME 62,300 TROOPS WERE INVOLVED IN THE MANEUVER. NOT ONCE DID THE CSCE OBSERVERS SEE A LEOPARD TANK CLOSE UP. OBSERVERS HAD A CHANCE TO INSPECT A LEOPARD ONLY DURING LARES TEAM. EVEN THE

GERMAN ESCORT OFFICER AT GROSSER BAER EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT HAVING FAILED TO SHOW THE OBSERVERS MUCH ON THEIR LAST DAY IN THE FIELD.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT THE ALLIES CONTINUE THEIR POLICY OF TRYING TO SHOW CSCE OBSERVERS MORE RATHER THAN LESS. CINC CENT GENERAL SCHNELL MADE THIS POINT TWICE DURING HIS MEETINGS WITH THE OBSERVERS, NOTING THAT

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NATO HAD "NOTHING TO HIDE." THIS POLICY WAS SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED IN LARES TEAM, ALTHOUGH GROSSER BAER LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED. WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING THE OBSERVERS TO THE RIGHT SPOT AT THE RIGHT TIME BECAUSE OF THE "FREE PLAY" NATURE OF THE MANEUVERS. HOWEVER, THE EMBASSY BELIEVES A GENUINE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE OR FUTURE WARSAW PACT OBSERVERS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ACCUSE NATO OF COVERING UP.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE THAT A MOSCOW DATELINED "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE" ARTICLE OF SEPTEMBER 21 ON THE "BUNDESWEHR AS THE LARGEST ARMY IN WEST EUROPE" INDICATED THAT THE MILITARY ATTACHES WHO OBSERVED THE RECENT WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS WERE "AMAZED" AT THE OPENNESS WITH WHICH THE EAST BLOC ARMIES DEMONSTRATED THEIR POWER. THE OBSERVERS REPORTEDLY COULD ALSO PHOTOGRAPH ALL EQUIPMENT.

6. MEETINGS WITH SENIOR COMMANDERS. ONE OF THE HIGH POINTS OF BOTH EXERCISES WAS THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED CSCE OBSERVERS TO MEET WITH AND TO HEAR SENIOR NATO AND NATIONAL MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD. FOR EXAMPLE, GENERAL SCHNELL APPEARED AT BOTH GROSSER BAER AND LARES TEAM. AT LARES TEAM HE MADE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXERCISE.

DURING LARES TEAM GENERAL BLANCHARD OFFERED SOME REMARKS TO THE OBSERVERS. HE EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO SEND OBSERVERS. THE GENERAL CONTINUED THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO SHOW SUCH OBSERVERS THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CAPABILITIES OF ALLIED FORCES.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT SENIOR NATO AND NATIONAL COMMANDERS CONTINUE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO MEET WITH THE CSCE OBSERVERS AND BRIEF THEM PERSONALLY. MEETING AS MANY ALLIED COMMANDERS AS POSSIBLE ALSO PROVIDES PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE TO CSCE OBSERVERS OF THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND POLITICAL COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE. SUCH MEETINGS

ARE ALSO APPROPRIATE GIVEN THE AMBASSADORIAL AND GENERAL
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OFFICER RANK OF SOME CSCE OBSERVERS.

7. RECEPTION AND ACCOMMODATIONS. THE RECEPTION AND ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED BY GERMAN AND U.S. AUTHORITIES WERE OUTSTANDING. GROSSER BAER OBSERVERS STAYED AT THE AIRPORT HOLIDAY INN IN HANNOVER. THOSE ATTENDING LARES TEAM STAYED AT THE GRAND HOTEL IN THE CENTER OF NUERNBERG. THE CREATURE COMFORTS WERE EXCELLENT AND BOTH GOVERNMENTS DEFRAYED THE COSTS FOR LODGING, BREAKFAST, AND MEALS IN THE FIELD. BOTH COUNTRIES ALSO HOSTED FORMAL DINNER PARTIES AT WHICH MG FREVERT-NIEDERMEIN, LTG COOPER, AND THE AMBASSADORS OFFERED REMARKS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CSCE OBSERVER PROGRAM. THE LARES TEAM OBSERVERS APPRECIATED IN PARTICULAR HAVING BG ARCHIE J. CANNON, JR., DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 32ND AADCOM AND CHIEF OF THE VISITORS' BUREAU, ACCOMPANY THEM THROUGHOUT THE VISIT.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT THE QUALITY OF QUARTERS AND INDIVIDUAL ROOM ASSIGNMENT POLICY BE CONTINUED IN THE

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FUTURE. (COMMENT: WE NOTED THAT A NUMBER OF OBSERVERS INDICATED THEIR PREFERENCE FOR THE LARES TEAM ARRANGEMENTS AT A DOWNTOWN HOTEL RATHER THAN GROSSER BAER WHERE OBSERVERS WERE MORE OR LESS ISOLATED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF TOWN.)

8. SIMULATED USE OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE LARES TEAM EXERCISE INCLUDED THE SIMULATED USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. ON THE LAST DAY OF THE EXERCISE THE OBSERVERS WERE INFORMED THAT "BLUE" FORCES USED TWO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DESTROY AN "ORANGE" DIVISION HEADQUARTERS. THE SECOND WEAPON WAS USED AFTER IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE FIRST ONE HAD NOT LANDED ON THE TARGET. ALSO, THE OBSERVERS WERE ADVISED THAT A CHEMICAL ATTACK WAS JUDGED TO BE INEFFECTIVE.

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THE SIMULATED NUCLEAR STRIKES OCCASIONED QUESTIONS FROM BOTH THE SPANISH AND AUSTRIAN OBSERVERS. THE SPANIARD ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A MILITARY NEED TO EMPLOY SUCH WEAPONS IN VIEW OF THE POLITICIAL SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED. NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER WAS PROVIDED. THE AUSTRIAN OBSERVER WAS INTERESTED IN THE SIZE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS USED AND WAS TOLD THAT THE YIELD OF EACH WAS AROUND 5KT.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT WE REVIEW THE SIMULATED USE OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN AN FTX VIEWED BY CSCE OBSERVERS. THERE ARE CONFLICTING ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT SIMULATED USE ENHANCES DETERRENCE AND IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE GOAL OF DEMONSTRATING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES ONLY. NEVERTHELESS, THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE EMPHASIS SHOULD PROBABLY BE ON THE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF ALLIED FORCES TO DEFEND THE WEST. THE

SIMULATED USE OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTRODUCES POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND WAR-FIGHTING THEORY WHICH MAY BEST BE AVOIDED WITH CSCE OBSERVERS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD ENVISAGE A SOVIET OBSERVER ASKING FOR AN EXPLANATION WHY "ORANGE" FORCES DID NOT RETALIATE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MOREOVER, THE EMBASSY ASSUMES THERE ARE SUFFICIENT U.S. AND ALLIED MANEUVERS WHERE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS COULD BE SIMULATED WHEN CSCE OBSERVERS ARE NOT PRESENT.

WE NOTE THAT THE GERMANS DID NOT SIMULATE SUCH USE DURING GROSSER BAER. THE GERMANS DO NOT LIKE TO THINK OF THE FRG AS A CONVENTIONAL BATTLEFIELD AND ARE EVEN MORE SENSITIVE TO THE PROSPECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON GERMAN TERRITORY.

9.. BRIEFINGS

A. SENIOR BRIEFERS. THE MORNING BRIEFINGS BY BRIGADIER GENERAL CHARLES W. DYKE, ASSISTANT DIV CDR, 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION, WERE A PRIME FEATURE OF LARES TEAM. OTHER IMPORTANT SENIOR BRIEFERS INCLUDED BG CONFIDENTIAL

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VANCE, CANADIAN FORCES, MG WICKHAM, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT), AND BG ROON, NETHERLANDS FORCES. IN OUR OPINION, SUCH BRIEFINGS BY SENIOR COMMANDERS WERE SINCERELY APPRECIATED.

B. TRANSLATION OF BRIEFINGS. PROVIDING UNDER-STANDABLE BRIEFINGS SHOULD BE A KEY ELEMENT IN THE CSCE OBSERVER PROGRAM. DURING BOTH MANEUVERS THE OBSERVERS RECEIVED NUMEROUS COMPREHENSIVE BRIEFINGS ON THE TACTICAL FTX SITUATION. ON THE LAST TWO DAYS OF GROSSER BAER THE GERMANS PROVIDED A SIMULTANEOUS GERMAN TO ENGLISH TRANSLATION SERVICE FOR THOSE BRIEFINGS PROVIDED

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AT THE BASE IN DOERVERDEN. SEVERAL OBSERVERS AVAILED THEMSELVES OF THIS SERVICE. ENGLISH WAS THE PRINCIPAL LANGUAGE IN CONNECTION WITH LARES TEAM, WITH A GERMAN ESCORT OFFICER PROVIDING INFORMAL TRANSLATIONS INTO GERMAN OF REMARKS AS REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THE GERMAN OFFICER, ALTHOUGH GOOD, WAS NOT A PROFESSIONAL INTERPRETER AND THUS COULD NOT PROVIDE FULL AND COMPLETE TRANSLATIONS AT ALL TIMES.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT SIMULTANEOUS TRANSLATION SERVICES BE PROVIDED WHEREVER POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY FROM ENGLISH TO GERMAN. OBSERVERS INVITED FROM EMBASSIES IN BONN WILL NORMALLY BE COMPETENT IN GERMAN BUT NOT NECESSARILY IN ENGLISH. THE YUGOSLAV OBSERVER ADMITTED TO US THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SEPTEMBER 15

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MORNING BRIEFING AT LARES TEAM WHICH WAS GIVEN EXCLUSIVELY IN ENGLISH. IT SHOULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT WARSAW PACT OBSERVERS WILL BE COMPETENT IN ENGLISH AND THEREFORE U.S. AUTHORITIES SHOULD PLAN TO PROVIDE SOME TYPE OF PROFESSIONAL TRANSLATION SERVICE FOR ALL BRIEFINGS, WHETHER AT A BASE, HOTEL, OR IN THE FIELD.

C. NATURE OF BRIEFINGS. AT LARES TEAM THE U.S. INCLUDED BRIEFINGS ON MANEUVER DAMAGE CONTROL AND UMPIRES WHICH WERE STANDARD REFORGER-TYPE BRIEFINGS. AT THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIR ASSAULT) HEADQUARTERS THE CSCE OBSERVERS RECEIVED A STANDARD BRIEFING ON THE ROLE AND CAPABILITIES OF THE DIVISION WHICH PROVED OF GREAT INTEREST TO THEM. HOWEVER, THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A "THREAT" BRIEFING WHICH DESCRIBED THE PRINCIPAL WARSAW PACT AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS WHICH THE DIVISION EXPECTED TO ENCOUNTER IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS BRIEFING WAS DIS-CONTINUED WHEN MG WICKHAM APPEARED TO OFFER SOME COMMENTS ON HIS DIVISION.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT U.S. AUTHORITIES REVIEW THE NEED FOR MANEUVER DAMAGE CONTROL AND UMPIRE BRIEFINGS FOR CSCE OBSERVERS. THESE BRIEFINGS APPEAR TO BE OF MARGINAL VALUE FOR CSCE OBSERVERS. ALSO, THAT "THREAT" BRIEFINGS BE ELIMINATED OR MODIFIED, PARTICULARLY IF WARSAW PACT STATES ARE REPRESENTED AMONG THE OBSERVERS NEXT YEAR.

10. MANEUVER COLORS. A RELATIVELY MINOR FIX MIGHT BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN NEXT YEAR'S MANEUVERS TO WHICH CSCE OBSERVERS WILL BE INVITED WHICH MIGHT BE IMPORTANT IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT. THIS INVOLVES THE COLORS USED TO DEPICT THE OPPOSING SIDES IN THE MANEUVER. WE NOTED THAT THE GERMANS USED THE TRADITIONAL "RED" AND "BLUE" WHEREAS THE AMERICANS USED "ORANGE" AND "BLUE." HOWEVER, THE GERMANS HAD "RED" FORCES ATTACKING EASTWARD AND "BLUE" FORCES DEFENDING IN THE EAST AND COUNTER-ATTACKING WESTWARD. IN LARES TEAM THE "ORANGE" BAD GUYS ATTACKED WESTWARD AND WERE EVENTUALLY REPelled BY THE GOOD "BLUE" FORCES.

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RECOMMENDATION: THAT THE U.S. CONSIDER ADOPTING THE GERMAN IDEA OF REVERSING THE COLORS NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE IDEA OF REVERSING THE TRADITIONAL CONFRONTATION COLORS OF "BLUE" AND "RED" OR "ORANGE" MIGHT STRIKE SOME AS BAD PSYCHOLOGY AND NOT OF SUFFICIENT POLITICAL VALUE TO MERIT THE CHANGE. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THE IDEA IS WORTH CONSIDERING, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE GERMANS HAVE ALREADY IMPLEMENTED IT.

ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO ASSIGN COMPLETELY NEW COLORS, SUCH AS GREEN AND YELLOW, TO AVOID ANY INFERENCE OF THE REAL LIFE CONFRONTATION. SEVERAL

OBSERVERS POINTED OUT TO US THAT CONSIDERATION MIGHT
BE GIVEN TO RUNNING THE FTX IN A NORTH-SOUTH DIRECTION

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IF THIS WERE MILITARILY MEANINGFUL FOR ALLIED FORCES.

11. GERMAN EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CBM'S.
THE GERMAN BRIEFINGS AT GROSSER BAER PLACED MORE
EMPHASIS ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CSCE OBSERVER
PARTICIPATION THAN DID THE U.S. BRIEFINGS. FOR
EXAMPLE, TWO OF THE FIRST GROSSER BAER BRIEFERS STATED
THAT THE MANEUVER DID NOT REPRESENT A WAR BETWEEN NATO
AND THE PACT, ONLY BETWEEN "BLUE" AND "RED." HOWEVER,
U.S. BRIEFERS RARELY TOOK THIS POLITICAL FACTOR INTO
ACCOUNT. INSTEAD, LARES TEAM CSCE OBSERVERS WERE

EXPOSED TO THE SAME BRIEFINGS WHICH OTHER REFORGER
VISITORS RECEIVED. NO SENIOR U.S. BRIEFER MADE THE
POINT EARLY ON DURING THE EXERCISE THAT THE MANEUVER
WAS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ALLIED READINESS TO DEFEND
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WESTERN EUROPE AND DID NOT REPRESENT A THREAT TO ANY
OTHER NATION OR NATIONS. THE GERMANS, ON THE OTHER
HAND, MADE THIS POINT ON SEVERAL DIFFERENT OCCASIONS.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT AT LEAST THE INITIAL AND
CLOSING U.S. BRIEFINGS INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THE
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CSCE OBSERVER PARTICIPATION,
WITH THE BRIEFERS EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT MUTUAL CON-
FIDENCE AMONG NATIONS WILL BE ENHANCED BY SUCH VISITS
AND STRESSING THAT THE MANEUVERS ARE DESIGNED FOR
DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY.

12. PROPOSED VISIT TO GDR BORDER. AS AN ALTERNATIVE
PROGRAM FOR THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 16, U.S.
AUTHORITIES SUGGESTED A TRIP TO THE FRG-GDR BORDER AREA
RATHER THAN CONTINUING TO OBSERVE THE MANEUVER.
PRACTICALLY ALL OBSERVERS INDICATED THEIR PREFERENCE TO
VIEW THE MANEUVER.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT U.S. AUTHORITIES NOT SUGGEST
SUCH A TRIP IN THE FUTURE IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF A VISIT TO THE BORDER. SUCH A
SUGGESTION WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INAPPROPRIATE IF AN
EAST GERMAN WERE INCLUDED AMONG THE WARSAW PACT CSCE
OBSERVERS NEXT YEAR.

13. ESCORT OFFICERS. THE ESCORT OFFICERS FOR BOTH
MANEUVERS, GERMAN, AMERICAN AND CANADIAN, WERE ALL TOP
RATE AND DID AN EXCELLENT JOB IN ASSISTING THE
OBSERVERS AND ANSWERING THEIR QUESTIONS. HOWEVER, WE
DID NOTE THAT SOME OFFICERS WERE UNSURE WHAT CSCE WAS
ALL ABOUT.

ONE ESCORT OFFICER WAS AVAILABLE FOR EVERY THREE
OBSERVERS FOR EXERCISE LARES TEAM, WITH THE RATIO ABOUT

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FOUR TO ONE AT GROSSER BAER.

RECOMMENDATION: THAT ALL ESCORT OFFICERS, AS PART
OF THEIR PREPARATION FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT, BE BRIEFED
ON THE BASICS OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT, INCLUDING
SPECIFICALLY THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED THEREIN ON
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. FINALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT
THE LARES TEAM ESCORT-TO-OBSERVER RATIO WAS SLIGHTLY
HIGH, AND THAT ONE ESCORT OFFICER COULD EASILY SERVE
FOUR OR FIVE OBSERVERS AS WAS THE CASE AT GROSSER BAER.

14. AS WE OBSERVED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS TELEGRAM,
THE CSCE PROGRAM IS STILL IN ITS INFANCY. WE DO NOT
KNOW HOW FAR IT WILL PROGRESS, OR WHETHER WARSAW PACT
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NATIONS WILL EVER ACCEPT INVITATIONS OR ISSUE THEM

TO SUCH CENTRAL NATO MEMBERS AS OURSELVES AND THE GERMANS. THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE HAVE MADE ABOVE ARE INTENDED TO MAKE THE OBSERVER PROGRAM AS EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE AS POSSIBLE. SOME OF THEM INVOLVE DEPARTURES FROM OUR TRADITIONAL HABITS AND OTHERS -- SPECIFICALLY THOSE REGARDING RECONSIDERATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- PRESENT US WITH A GENUINE CONFLICT OF PRIORITIES BECAUSE THE SIMULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOES PROBABLY INCREASE THE DETERRENT VALUE OF OUR MANEUVERS EVEN IF IT DOES NOT PERHAPS BUILD CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF CSCE. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO SORT OUT THESE POINTS HERE BUT WE BELIEVE THAT, IF THE CBM PROGRAM IS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, SUCH ISSUES WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH OBSERVER EXCHANGES MOVE FORWARD.

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Margaret P. Grafeld

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EO Systematic Review

04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:

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Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

Secure: OPEN

Status: NATIVE

Subject: CSCE/CBM'S: EMBASSY OBSERVER REPORT BEGIN SUMMARY: AN EMBASSY OFFICER VISITED BOTH THE GROSSER BAER (SEPTEMBER 6-9) AND LARES TEAM (SEPTE

TAGS: MORG, GE, XH, CSCE, NATO, WTO

To: STATE

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006